social ecology and dialogical philosophy

2. Some philosophical foundations:
In order to broaden the interpretation of the concept of diversity, Arne Naess utilizes various concepts extracted form Spinoza’s philosophy. This combination of Naess and Spinoza is particularly engaging for Spinoza has always held a special fascination for ecological oriented thinkers. Spinoza's God or Nature (Deus sive Nature) intrigued those who attempted to ground an ecological ethics on strictly secular, non-religious principles. This last statement should be understood in the context of the distinction between religion (as an organized institution and a theology) and religiosity (the personal or communal relationship with the divinity).
As Naess writes in Spinoza And The deep Ecology Movement , “The deterioration of life conditions on earth has motivated many people to take up the philosophical and religious basis for their action in favor of the preservation of the richness and diversity of life on earth” (pg.2) The confluence of theology, ethics and ecology has been called Theological Ecology. One earlier version of ecological theology can be found in the works of the Jewish theologian, A. J. Heschel. Heschel, in his book The Sabbath renders a quasi-poetic description of the religious and the political meaning of the category of the “holy” when it is associated with the category of “time”.
For Heschel, the dichotomy is between time and space, not space and spirit. This is important because based on the concept of time, which is, by convention, a measurable category, Heschel provided the foundations for a religious social agenda. There is an inherent difficulty in conceiving a politics of the "spirit". Time, in contrast, is part and parcel of the concrete day-to-day life of individuals and societies. Heschel's argument was for the primacy of time, or the life of connection with the "eternal" over the life of acquisitive matter. The time-eternal in contrast to the materialistic realm of Capitalism. One immediate result from this is the call for less exploitation of natural resources and the devotion of more time to what in psychological terms is known as "leisure".
According to Naess, an intimation of ecological thought appears in Spinoza’s concept that the identity of God with Nature is expressed in the affirmation that God is actually present in, and expresses “himself” through each existing being. God is a constitutive part of the things themselves. In other words, the identity of god and nature is not merely an abstract intellectual construct but a practical systemic assumption of the Spinozistic thesis. Naess writes “The Ethics furnishes no basis for assuming that the immanent God expresses its nature, essence or power (all key Spinozian concepts) in any other way other than through each existing being” (pg. 5)
The ecological implications of this are very important. For Spinoza, the practical application of the love of God-Nature is manifested in a relational attitude, in a type of I-Thou relationship to the natural realm, (Buber) or an enlightened approach to the insentients and all other living beings (Zen), not in a devotional, ritualistic religious system. This relational attitude can also be coasted in political terms as a deep-ecology. In Naesse’s words: “Therefore, Amor Intellectualis Dei must somehow be a love of these existing particular beings of our everyday life-parts of the total richness and diversity of life forms on earth.” (Pg. 5) Later “Love of the immanent God, is love of God’s expression. If a being expresses God’s nature or essence, love of God cannot be different form love of such a being” (pg. 6) The question with political implications is: what sort of social behavior is appropriate for those who believe in a God-Nature system?
Naess makes the point that for Spinoza, the immanent presence of God in nature is actually the presence of God’s power, essence or nature in that being. Power and essence are the forms by which God expresses his being. In mystical kabbalah, God is also said to be present in nature, but the form of that presence takes a more abstract and “spiritual” term, it is call the Shekhina or immanent –yet at the same time transcendent- presence of divinity within each and every object and being in nature. In Kabbalah, God is present in every object in the form of “seeds of Holiness” that must be released from their natural encapsulation. The release of the sparks or seeds of godliness is done through an ethical relationship with nature as a whole. In that sense Spinoza and the Kabbalah share a similar perspective. For Spinoza however, God is present thorough its own nature and therefore is not apart from, but is a part of, and the same as nature. In reverse we can say that nature is present in God not as a part of, that would be pan-entheism, but as the same as God himself. As Naess puts it “ God is not apart from God’s expressions” (pg. 6) Naess again states the conclusion that “In light of the above argumentation, the Intellectualis Amor Dei may be interpreted as Loving understanding of particular beings. ” By focusing on the “particular beings” issue, we can infer from Spinoza the need to protect and encourage the diversity of each member of the ecological habitat. This connects the generalized aspects of environmentalism in Spinoza's philosophical approach, with the issue of diversity as interpreted in social ecology. Therefore we can follow Spinoza's thought to arrive at the foundations for a political programme of social ecology.
Can the claim be made that the goals of Naesse’s deep ecology are in accordance with Spinoza’s premises? Naess writes ”The philosophical aim of the deep ecology movement, as I see it, may be formulated in a way no different from that of Spinoza when he speaks about God or nature and the role of particulars” Again the issue of particulars, the quandary of diversity.
Naess recognized however that Spinoza’s Ethics cannot be easily translated into concrete policy formulations. Naess writes “The Ethics does not go into politics, but does express views on community.” (Pg11) It is important that Naess sees Spinoza as establishing views on the issue of community, contrasting the term “community” with “politics”. Building on the prior distinction between gemeinshaft and geselshaft, Buber made the same basic distinctions in his analysis of the regenerating of society. Naesse’s view of Spinoza is important because I argue that are precisely those views on community that render Spinoza valuable for our analysis of diversity and urbanism. More specifically, interpreting Spinoza’s views about particulars and diversity, we begin to intimate a position closer to the goals of social ecology. I argue that Spinoza's contentions, when modified with key concepts from other philosophers of community such as Martin Buber, become an adequate basis upon which to contribute to the resolution of the ethical dilemmas of diversity and its public policy spatial implications.
Whatever divergences can be found between specific policies advocated by Naess' deep ecology movement, and philosophical formulations found in Spinoza, may be the result of the different ways in which we, in our time, and under the current environmental circumstances, have come to know and understand the reality of ecological systems. We may want to make the intellectual jump and assume that Spinoza himself, under these same conditions, and knowing what we know today, would have interpreted his own philosophy more closely to the specific policy terms of communal ecology. After all, the love of particulars implies their preservation and care. In short, we can say that at the very least, Spinoza serves the social ecology movement as a heuristic tool.
As I stated above, it is very fruitful to attempt to combine some of Naesse’s Spinoza with Buber and outline a philosophical basis for the understanding of the issue of diversity in the public realm. We will look now at some concrete samples of ethical dilemmas raised by issues of spatial policy at the national and urban spheres and as a conclusion I will suggest that we review again the Hasidic relative communal success in the application of the rules of spatial propinquity in the modern western city.
As mentioned above, Naesse’s interpretation of Spinoza becomes the more relevant and meaningful when modified through a combination of other “dialogical” philosophical theories. In this article I will attempt to show how Spinoza can be interpreted and justified through a reading of Buber and other philosophers of encounter and community.
Some philosophical aspects of ecological theory, in particular, ethics, offer fascinating policy implications in the areas of urbanism, cultural policy, ethnic and race relations, class analysis and environmentalism. In particular, some aspects of ecological ethics can help us re-evaluate the validity and legitimacy of the concept we coined earlier in this paper concerning the “continuum territory-ethnicity-culture.” Ultimately, ethics is the study of inter-relationships, that is, behavior towards the “other” and the principles that inform it.
Ecological ethics deals with interactions at two levels: Interpersonal and Environmental. When both these levels are combined we refer to it as Ecological Ethics.
Briefly stated, there are three ethical paradigms of relevance in the context of ecological ethics. These paradigms are identified in accordance with what’s perceived to be their central grounding, or the main justificatory principle informing their conceptual perspectives. The three paradigms are Monism, Dualism and Utilitarianism.
The importance of Monism in the context of this analysis is that Spinoza was considered a Monist. A monist perspective tends to identify self with nature. For a monist, the whole of being is one. The one being is encompassed within the realm of one single substance, with which is identified as one and the same. There are various degrees of exactness to this. For some monists, the unity of being is manifested not necessarily in ontological terms, but mainly in ecological, or mutual dependency terms. (as in some of the environmentalist discourse). In monism, being all one substance, the ethical treatment of the inanimate or insentients is not a separate category from the ethical treatment of fellow sentient beings. This point is forcefully insisted upon by most Buddhist views of nature-human interrelationships. Whatever ethical principles apply to man, apply to nature as well and vice versa. It is in this sense that Naess finds Spinoza, the philosopher of the love of nature, to be particularly relevant to the deep ecology movement. I will argue later that Buber’s realm of “the between”, offers a novel approach to the dilemma of monism versus dualism. One realm which is neither, but which encompasses and transcends both.
In contrast to Monism, a dualist perspective posits a clear categorical distinction between the substance of nature, within which man’s corporeality falls, and the nature of the soul, or the immaterial essence of man. Dualism also varies in degrees of exactness. If Spinoza is the principal monist, Descartes is the main figure representing the dualist perspective. The soul, for a dualist, belongs in a higher hierarchically perspective superior and above nature. For a dualist the ethical concerns of man do not fully coincide with those of nature.
Utilitarianism is a more conventional view of ethics, and in it, the major concern is with the maximization of benefits (however defined) from the utilization, or the lack of utilization, of nature. Utilitarians, depending on their view as to the physical capacities of nature and sustainable development, may find themselves in any policy end of the debate.
It is important to introduce one more important distinction. Oftentimes, the ethical structure of ecological thought is coasted in terms of anthropocentrism versus bio-centrism. This distinction is very important because the contrariness of both positions, collapses in Spinoza’s monism. Anthropocentrists and biocentrists are found in both the dualist and utilitarian models. For that reason, Spinoza's monism represents a more adequate foundation for ecological communitarianism. Spinoza could be regarded as an eco-centrist.
The term “Dialogue” is based on Buber’s conceptualizations. Buber’s categories of I-Thou and I-It can assume, in my view, a central role in deep ecology ethics, particularly, when mediated through Naesse’s Spinoza. Ecological ethics is the ethics of dialogue . It is important to reconsider the use of the term “relationship” when referring to Buber. For Buber the mutuality that the term dialogue entails should be understood more as a “turn” or “attitude” towards the world rather than an active approach towards a relationship. Intentional approaches are part of the definition of an IT . Turn is a Thou. This distinction places Buber closer to Zen’s attitude towards the world of the sentient and insentient beings.
In Buber’s terms, there are two basic attitudinal categories with regards to the other: I-Thou and I-It. An It is generally an object serving a specified utilitarian goal or purpose of the user. In contrast, a Thou refers to a fully open, non-manipulative, non-utilitarian and reciprocal relationship. Dialogue is the categorical opposite of reification, manipulation or exploitation. According to Buber, both the isolated I and the collectivist We, are illusory categories of identity. There is only the I of the I-Thou or I-It pair. In Buber’s terms however, the I of the I-Thou continuum constitutes genuine personhood and the higher level of ethical relationships. There is an I-It relationship attitude towards God and there is an I-Thou relationship attitude towards God.
In practical terms, no human society can survive without the “It”, but it is only within the I-Thou dyad that the I emerges as genuine person. Personhood, or identity, emerges only from within the context of the I-Thou relational-behavior. In ecological ethics, identity is defined in terms of the relation and attitude towards nature, that is, the ethical confirmation of nature constitutes identity, and there can be no “selfhood” outside of dialogue with nature.
Zen’s concern with the no-self is identical to Buber’s interpretation. For Buber there is no self in an I-It relationship. The self that emerges during the between of the I-Thou relationship is akin to Zen’s enlightened mind.
In Buber’s terms there are three levels for dialogue and two basic inter-relational attitudes: The levels for dialogue are between man and nature, between man and man, and between man and the realm of the Spiritual. The two relational postures that apply to each of the three realms are I-Thou and I-It. All dialogue centers around man’s attitude towards the “other”. Dialogue requires a form of paradoxical intentionality and reciprocity, however intentionality and reciprocity easily slip into the realm of the It.
This is important in terms of Spinoza’s contention that love of nature does not imply reciprocal love back from nature. According to Buber, non-humans do posses a capacity to reciprocate (in their own way and from where they stand), but lack the ability of conscious dialogical intentionality. It is man’s duty then, as is his vocation and reward, to be called upon to assume the entire responsibility for that relationship with nature. In this model, responsibility connotes not only the duty to protect and preserve alterity, but in essence, it is a general attitude, or borrowing John Dewey’s term, an “orientation” towards nature holding the promise of what in deep ecology is referred to as “self realization.”
From Buber’s perspective, self realization can only be attained through self-transcendence. That is, to the extent that the self is oriented, not inwards, but dialogically towards the other, it becomes possible for the I to attain true ontological identity. In Buddhism, the concept of compassion serves exactly in the same capacity as Buber’s dialogue, that is, as that human attitude centered on an introspective attitude towards the core of the self, while at the same time, seeing the inter-personal as a pre-condition for introspection. In the Dalai Lama’s words, it is exactly when compassion is put to play that the enlightenment achieved through introspection acquires its deepest meaning. Both for Buber and for Zen, the I, apart form the I of the I-Thou dyad can not be said to posses ontological reality. This represents the deep-ecology meaning of the concept of dialogue.
Genuine dialogue, writes Buber, cannot be generated if preceded by willful intention. In Naess’s words, “Intentions are objectivations of purposes before they are realized” . Also in Buddhism we can see the parallel to this in the concept of detachment and the spiritual freedom it generates. From this discussion we can say that the reference to intentionality in the context of dialogue, must be understood to allude to the overall-life-orientation of man towards others. The transcending of utilitarian manipulations is also encapsulated in Spinoza's dictum that love of God-nature, is its own reward.
In this regard, Frankl added, “We have said that religion is genuine only where it is existential...now, we have seen that the existentiality of religiousness has to be matched by its spontaneity...Intentionality would thwart the effect..” It is in this sense that the relationship man-nature is the more profoundly open to dialogical realization. It is also this aspect of dialogue that is at the center of ecological thought. The issue then is to reassess the relationship towards nature as constituting a radically more profound dialogue between man and nature, beyond the recreational, observational or even mere preservationist stands. In Buddhism intentionality towards enlightenment is a paradoxical category given that enlightenment cannot be willed but it also cannot be obtained without a determined human attitude towards the path leading to enlightenment.
This argument strongly supports the claims of deep ecology with respect to man’s attitude towards nature. In Victor Frankl’s terms, “human existence -at least as long as it has not been neurotically distorted- is always directed to something, or someone other than itself -be it a meaning to fulfill or another human being to encounter lovingly...What is called “self-actualization” is ultimately an effect, the unintentional by-product, of “self transcendence.” In different terms also Levinas defined personhood in terms of the attitude towards the other, however not with the unintentional modifier encounter in Frenkel. .
Some have raised criticisms to the concept of self-realization in ecological ethics. The argument is that deep ecology’s misses the point by emphasizing the “self,” a predicate which does not account for the fact that “selves” are constructions in the wider context of cultural practices. Critics claim that Deep ecology seems at times to be working out of a Cartesian notion of autonomous selves. But as we have seen, Naess's reliance on Spinoza and Spinoza's conceptual connection to Buber weakens the substance of that criticism. For Spinoza, according to Naess, the most important imperative was the knowledge of God. But, according to Spinoza, knowledge is derived through an act of rational love. (amore Deus rational) (Particularly parts IV and V of the Ethics, and Spinoza’s earlier works, in which political its political principles are partially derived from his underlying metaphysics.) Therefore, no doubt remains that for Spinoza, in order to fulfill our highest rationalist goals we must pursue a thorough ecological ethics. When placed within the context of ecological ethics, Spinoza’s Love is the equivalent of Buber’s Thou. The Love of God is the love of and within nature.
Buber's derivation of identity from within relational situations, provides a strong philosophical support to the ecological model of identity. In this same vein, Heschel, in the Sabbath, writes that while in the western world the intellectual task has been centered on the task of knowing oneself (from Philosophy to Psychoanalysis), the Biblical call was to know God first, that is, self transcendence towards the other. (Contrast for instance the title of one of Rollo May’s books “Man’s Search for Himself” with one of Heschel’s “Man in Search of God.”) Frankl refers to this when he remarks that the derivation of self identity results from acts of self-transcendence. In general, we can say that the intellectual task for deep ecology is to incorporate an ethics of self realization through dialogue.
One of ecological thought's main tenets is the rejection of strict utilitarian views of nature. Buber attempted to establish social conditions under which non-utilitarianism in the daily life of a community would be applicable. Buber introduced concepts drawn from libertarian communitarianism in order to exemplify a possible application of dialogical attitudes in the realm of the social. Dialogue is a social category, but sometimes may also be interpreted as referring to the interpersonal as in the case of only a pair of participants. Buber wanted to see the dialogical principle applied within small communities and in a modified manner, applied to society as a whole. The global application of dialogue was formulated through the advocacy of the notion of small communal self-managed cooperative societies linking with each other through a federation of larger autonomous bodies.
Buber found that his Dialogical formulations translated into a social philosophy in the context of positions encountered mainly within the traditions of pacifist-anarchism. Buber, influenced by the anarchist philosopher Gustav Landauer , developed a clear political programme. Buber also found that the dialogical aspects of ecological theory find a basis in Kant’s imperative to treat each individual always as an end, never as a means or as a tool.
An interesting connection can be made here between Buber and some concepts developed by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein wrote that Ethics and Aesthetics are one and the same thing. Inasmuch as both concepts refer to forms of intentional relationship towards the “other,” it is fitting to say that both are but different aspects of the same reality. (This conception also has implications for an understanding of the cultural connections between national conceptions of ethics and the cultural aesthetic expressions manifested in national or ethnic arts, music and literature.) Without engaging in a thorough discussion on the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s use of Spinoza’s term Sub Species Aeternitatis in connection with the sameness of aesthetics and ethics reinforces the view that for Wittgenstein, the connection between the two was Spinozian in essence.
Although religion and theology can contribute to the concept of deep ecology, the ecological model at play is not theology but Spinoza’s modified form of monism. Spinoza’s monism is a profoundly secular (non-theistic) spirituality where God and Nature are identified as one and the same substance. It is precisely within this secular context that, following Arne Naess, a strong foundation for ecological ethics can be established in the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinoza’s monism represents the first and most thorough attempt to theorize the relationship between a monistic conception of nature and the ethical imperatives derived thereof.
Furthermore, it is in this particular field of ethical-ecology that other philosophies of the “other” find full political expression. In particular, the philosophies of the other as in Levinas as well as elements of Whitehead’s Process philosophy. As mentioned above, it is within the realm of ecology that a “unified field” gets established and the manifold contributions of Spinoza and Buber, Levinas and Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Frankl and Kant, meet, interact, and bear fruit in the form of critical approaches to ecological policy. In its more secular sense also the philosophies of Buddhism belong in this tradition.